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AN INITIAL INVES TIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF TOURIS M ON LOCAL 
BUDGETS : A COMPARATIVE ANALYS IS  OF S PANIS H MUNICIPALITIES  
 
 
 
ABS TRACT 
Tourist municipalities in Spain have, particularly since 2008, been vocal about a “chronic 
deficit” linked to public expenditures. Within this context, new strategies to increase revenues 
have been proposed, including the introduction of tourist taxes. This paper contributes to this 
debate by determining if tourism activity actually has a negative impact on local finances. To 
that end, a comparative analysis is undertaken of budget structures between tourist and non-
tourist municipalities using data from more than 3,200 Spanish municipalities for the years 
2001 to 2010. The determinants of expenditure, revenues and deficit per capita are identified 
using linear regression. The results found a direct relationship between tourist activity and 
local deficits in the smallest and largest municipalities, while a beneficial effect is actually 
seen in the remainder of the sample. In view of this evidence, the option of introducing new 
tourist taxes should be more restricted in scope and depend upon further evidence on possible 
cost inefficiency in the affected municipalities. 
Keywords: Tourist taxes, public budgets, local finances, Spanish municipalities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis has tightened the budgets of local and regional administrations in Spain, 
regardless of their size. Between 2009 and 2012, the aggregate budget of the Spanish 
municipalities decreased by approximately 16%, from 57.6 to 48.3 billion euro (MHyAAPP, 
2013). This translated into a severe reduction in public services. These budget cuts are 
particularly problematic for tourist areas, which must service a floating visitor population that 
in many cases significantly outnumbers the permanent residents. Among these additional 
services, one can mention policing, cleaning, tourist offices, cultural and sport facilities, 
waste processing, environmental protection, etc.… Also, note that the seasonal nature of 
these visitor flows creates the need to maintain the tourism infrastructure during the off-peak 
season. In contrast to the increased expenditures, the recession-driven reduction in the 
number of visitors during 2009 and 2010, as well as the reduction in their average spending, 
led to a substantial drop in revenues that amounted to the problem (IET, 2011). 
The Spanish Law1 recognises the particularities of tourist municipalities and establishes a 
number of specific funding alternatives to help them cover their increased expenditures 
(Márquez, 2008). Regional governments, e.g. the Valencian Community, have also 
introduced complementary regulations along the same lines (Pastor and Soler, 2009). In spite 
of this, the Spanish Federation of Provinces and Municipalities (FEMP, 2008) reports that 
local administrations in tourist areas suffer from a “chronic deficit”. Two main limitations of 
the existing laws are pointed out: i) the restrictive definition of “tourist municipality”, which 
requires the number of hotel beds plus second residences to be strictly higher than the number 
of permanent residences; and ii) the limited funding alternatives associated to that status. A 
number of strategies to improve local revenues for tourist cities were then proposed by the 
FEMP, including more government transfers or the introduction of tourist taxes, some of 
which have recently been implemented in major areas, e.g. Barcelona. 
These demands for more tax differentiation led us to question whether tourism activity has a 
significant impact on municipal budget structures to the extent that a more specific regulatory 
framework can be justified. We propose a two-stage process to achieve this objective: first, 
the hypothesis of a “chronic deficit” linked to tourism can be tested by using the observed 
revenues and expenditures. If such a deficit were to be found, then a second analysis would 
require removing the effect of cost inefficiency that may be inflating these expenditures. Only 
at this point would the introduction of new taxes and regulations be justifiable. 
This paper aims to undertake the first stage of this process and to test the “chronic deficit” 
hypothesis that supports further research on the suitability of revised regulations. This is 
achieved by identifying any substantial differences in expenditure and revenue structures 
between tourist and non-tourist municipalities in Spain, as well as determining the impact of 
tourism on local finances. Surprisingly, there appears to be a gap in the empirical literature on 
this particular subject, as previous studies have focused on other political and socioeconomic 
variables as determinants of municipal budgets. 
To achieve these objectives, a comparative analysis is carried out using an unbalanced pool 
database of more than 3,200 Spanish municipalities of all sizes between 2001 and 2010. An 
indicator of tourism supply is used in order to classify the sample municipalities as tourist or 
non-tourist. Inferential statistics are then employed to establish significant differences 
between tourist and non-tourist municipalities in all components of local budgets and also in 
financial ratios calculated from the same data. Finally, the determinants of expenditure, 
revenues, deficit and debt per capita are identified using linear regression. Besides tourism 
                                                 
1
 Ley Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales. Real Decreto 2/2004. 
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supply, other variables included are population, income, unemployment and for the first time, 
due to the availability of panel data, election cycles and recession years. 
The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature 
review on all subjects relevant to the paper in order to support the originality of our 
contribution. Section 3 describes the database and methodology. Section 4 carries out the 
comparative analysis of budget structures and discusses the determinants of municipal 
revenues, expenditures and deficit per capita. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It has long been established that tourism creates both positive and negative effects for the 
residents and the local economies (Kaiser and Helber, 1978), and there is an abundance of 
research on the economic, environmental and cultural dimensions of the tourism impact 
(Brunelli et al., 2010). From the economic perspective, tourism has been commonly seen as a 
relatively risk-free solution to increase local revenues and promote economic activity (Wong, 
1996). On the contrary, some authors indicate that the evident impact on municipal 
expenditures to cater for the floating visitor population must lead to a saturation level when 
tourism stops paying off (Young, 1973). In spite of these opposing views, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence on the direct impact of tourism activity on municipal finances, especially 
in recent times. As a result, few valuable references on this specific topic could be found. 
First, the article by Wong (1996) studied the impact of tourism activity on local expenditures 
for a cross-section of 155 US counties. Exhaustive lists of different components of local 
expenditures per capita were regressed (using Ordinary Least Squares - OLS) against 
socioeconomic variables such as population, employment, income and crime rates. In 
addition, the reliance of the local economy on tourism is measured as a ratio between 
tourism-related payroll and total payroll expenses. As expected, the results indicate that 
tourism has a positive impact on many components of municipal expenditure, including fire, 
police, transportation, parks and recreation and local administration. While the analysis is 
sound, it is clearly limited by the lack of a revenue perspective to balance the discussion. 
In that regard, a second reference is Deller et al. (1997), who analysed the impact of the 
provision of recreational housing on local expenditures and revenues (a "holistic" approach) 
using a cross-sectional sample of 69 counties in the state of Wisconsin (US) for 1990. Also 
employing an OLS regression with similar variables, the tourism activity is now proxied by 
the number of recreational houses per capita. The resulting elasticities indicate that the 
provision of seasonal housing pays for itself by increasing the potential for local revenue-
generation of a similar amount as the associated increase in demand for public services. 
The related literature on Spanish municipalities is very limited. However, the evidence 
produced so far is of great interest for our research. The most comprehensive contribution on 
the topic is from Zafra-Gómez et al. (2009), who focused on identifying the key determinants 
of local financial performance. Using a large country-wide database, a very detailed typology 
of municipalities is developed, based on a number of socioeconomic variables that include 
local tourism revenues and other indicators of economic activity. Results suggest that tourism 
development leads to higher expenditures, yet also to improved liquidity, solvency and 
overall budgetary sustainability. These results agree with Pastor and Soler (2009), who 
provide a comparative analysis of budget structures among 542 tourist and non-tourist 
municipalities in the Autonomous Region of Valencia in 2005. The distinction between 
different types of municipalities is based on the regulatory definitions explained in the 
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introduction. The analysis is purely descriptive and concludes that the hypothesis of the 
“chronic deficit” of tourist municipalities is not true, as they enjoy higher financial autonomy 
and present a similar tax burden than non-tourist areas. While this challenges the very same 
claims that motivate this paper, it is worth noting the absence of any statistical inference to 
support their conclusions.  
Additional methodological references can be obtained from a second body of literature, 
which is linked to the identification of the determinants of local deficit or tax burden (without 
a specific mention to tourism). In this topic, that are many articles that focus on Spanish 
municipalities, including Lago-Peñas (2004) for the Region of Galicia; Sollé-Ollé (2006), 
Fluvià et al. (2008), Bastida et al. (2009) and Benito et al. (2010) with Spanish-wide samples; 
and the post-recession studies of López-Hernández et al. (2012) and Zárate and Vallés 
(2012), the latter for the Region of Aragón. 
The most common variable is population (see e.g., Allers et al., 2001; Petterson-Lidbom, 
2001; Castells et al., 2004). This allows us to test for scale economies in the provision of 
public services at a local level, whose existence and reach remain a contested issue.2 While 
some theoretical studies assume that scale economies exist, based on the fixed nature of many 
local resources (King, 1996), the empirical evidence is unclear, with studies like Sollé-Ollé 
(2006) reporting positive scale effects, and Vanden-Eeckaut et al. (1993) concluding the 
opposite. Other studies (Sollé-Ollé, 2006; Gonçalvez and Veiga, 2007; Zafra-Gómez et al., 
2009) use population density or population strata. Alternatively, Fluvià et al. (2008) proves 
that deficit rises with the number of population centres in each municipality, arguing that the 
benefits of consolidation linked to returns to scale are not fully realized when population is 
dispersed, as some basic infrastructures (e.g. roads, sewage, etc.…) cannot be concentrated. 
Attention is also paid to demographic indicators such as the proportion of elderly (>65) and 
young (<20) residents, or the immigration rate (e.g. Zafra-Gómez et al., 2009). These age 
groups are key drivers of demand for municipal services such as employment, health or 
education, while a significant proportion of senior citizens would lead to a decrease in 
demand for sport facilities, for example (Zárate and Vallés, 2012). Per capita income and 
unemployment rate are common economic indicators; with the first possibly stratified 
depending on the sources of data (Bastida et al., 2009, Benito et al., 2010). More recently, 
Zárate and Vallés (2012) have also analysed the impact of any debt limits imposed on the 
local administration in the wake of the recession. This is shown to increase the tax burden 
since access to debt is restricted. 
Political variables have also been found to have an impact on local budgets. A basic indicator 
is the left- or right-wing orientation of the governing party, which can take the form of a 
continuous (Allers et al., 2001) or a binary variable (Gonçalvez and Veiga, 2007). The 
consensus is that left-wing parties tend to spend more than centre or right-wing governments 
(Bastida et al., 2009). Election years are said to control for opportunistic increases in public 
spending and reduced taxation linked to electoral cycles (Petterson-Lidborn, 2001; Galli and 
Rossi, 2002; Guillamón et al., 2012; Bastida et al., 2013). Additional variables account for 
stable majorities (Lago-Peñas, 2004), government coalitions or newly created parties (Sollé-
Ollé, 2006). 
The present paper builds on these previous contributions, especially with regards to the 
holistic approach and the OLS regression methodology, but it is able to differentiate itself in 
several ways. First, this is with a significantly larger database that can potentially lead to 
more reliable results. Second, we explicitly classify the municipalities by using an indicator 
                                                 
2
 A comprehensive survey on the topic is provided in Fluvià et al. (2008).  
Commented [Pr1]: Please check this wording is correct. 
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that considers more aspects of tourism supply beyond the mere provision of recreational 
housing. With respect to the determinants of local budgets, given the size of our cross-section 
(3500+ municipalities), some of the political variables are not available at the required level 
of disaggregation. In spite of this, we benefit from ten-year time series data (2000-2010) to 
introduce electoral cycles and recession years in the estimated models. These are both novel 
contributions to the empirical analysis of the impact of tourism on local budgets that expand 
the limited empirical evidence available in the literature. 
 
3. DATABAS E AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Database and variables 
In order to achieve the proposed objectives, a large database was compiled from a variety of 
sources. It comprises all 3,411 municipalities in Spain with a population over 1,000 
permanent residents3, observed between 2001 and 2010. The panel is unbalanced, with a 
grand total of 31,987 observations. While the number of municipalities is less than half of 
those that exist in Spain, our sample covers more than 95% of the entire Spanish population. 
The database combines financial data with social, economic and political indicators. 
Financial reports for the sample municipalities are made publicly available online by the 
Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administrations (MHyAAPP).4 Revenues are classified 
in different chapters according to their source. Chapters I, II and III comprise direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and other local taxes, respectively. Combined, these sections can be defined as 
a measure of the municipality's ability to generate tributary income from its own residents 
and visitors and will be a key determinant of its financial autonomy. 
On the expenditure side, two separate classifications are provided. The first one (Expenditure 
1) follows a similar structure as before, with general categories such as personnel, goods and 
services, or financial costs. The second classification (Expenditure 2) is more informative and 
links the expenditures to the programmes they fund. These include, for example, 
administration, police, health, education, transport and also repaying public debt. This 
information is summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Regulatory classification of local revenues and expenditures in Spain 
Chapters Revenues Expenditures (1) Chapters Expenditures (2) 
I Direct taxes Personnel 1 Basic services Safety , housing and environment. 
II Indirect taxes Goods and services 2 Police and emergency  
III Other local taxes Financial expenses 3 Social protection Employ ment and pensions 
IV Current transfers Current transfers 4 Social services Health, education, culture and sport 
V Property  income Property  expenses 5 Economic activities Agriculture, industry , infrastructure and R&D 
VI Disposal of assets Disposal of assets 6 General regulation  
VII Capital transfers Capital transfers 7 Economic regulation  
VIII Financial assets Financial assets 9 Transfers  
IX Financial liabilities Financial liabilities 0 Public debt  
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (Ministry of Economy and Finance) 
 
With regards to the explanatory variables, La Caixa’s Economic Yearbook5 provides a local 
tourism indicator (tur), which indicates the municipality’s percentage contribution6 to the 
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 This threshold is linked to the scope of La Caixa’s database, which does not include municipalities below that 
population threshold. 
4
 http://servicioswebbis.meh.es/apps/entidadeslocales/ 
5
 http://www.lacaixa.comunicacions.com/se/ 
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tourism subsection of the national trade tax revenues (Impuesto de actividades económicas - 
IAE) for the year 2011. The IAE for tourism-related businesses in Spain is determined by 
three variables: number of tourist beds, average annual occupation and the category of the 
establishment. Thus, the amounts originating from each municipality can be used as a proxy 
of local tourism supply. In addition, the same source provides a global economic activity 
indicator (eco), obtained as the ratio of municipal to national IAE revenues. 
(Eq. 1) tur = (local tourism IAE revenues)/(national tourism IAE revenues) 
(Eq. 2) eco = (local IAE revenues)/(national IAE revenues) 
Our research objective requires splitting the sample between tourist and non-tourist 
municipalities. Previous literature on related topics has employed location quotients (LQ) in 
order to identify those regions with an above-average concentration of tourism activity (see 
e.g. Klein et al., 2005; Thompson, 2007; Gülcan et al., 2009). These can be calculated as a 
ratio of local and national tourism concentrations, measured as the proportion of tourism-
related jobs to total jobs at each level, for example. While detailed data on jobs, hotel beds or 
similar variables is not available at a municipal level, we can compute a revenue-based LQ of 
municipal tourism intensity (LQtur) as follows: 
 
(Eq. 3)            
𝐿𝑄𝑡𝑢𝑟 =  
𝑡𝑢𝑟
𝑒𝑐𝑜
=
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
=
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐴𝐸 𝑟𝑒𝑣.
 
 
 
Thus, any municipality with LQtur>1 shows a level of tourism intensity above the national 
average and is labelled as “tourist”, while those with LQtur<1 are labelled “non-tourist”7.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of Spanish municipalities according to LQtur. The most 
noticeable aspect of this distribution is its extreme asymmetry, with the vast majority of 
municipalities (87.46%) located below 1. The municipality with the highest tourism intensity 
in Spain is the coastal town of Muro, in the Balearic Island of Mallorca. The remaining top 
cities draw a very diverse picture of the Spanish tourism industry. Besides the coastal areas 
along the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, as well as in the Islands, it is also possible to find 
ski resorts, e.g. Naut Aran (Catalonia); nature/mountain destinations such as Biescas 
(Aragon); cultural/religious places, e.g. Camaleño (Cantabria); or small towns that are 
thriving on wine tourism, such as Elciego (Basque Country).  
Table 2. Distribution of sample municipalities according to LQtur 
LQtur 
Municipalities 
 
Examples 
freq cumul. %  cumul. 
 >27 1 1 0.03% 0.03% 
 
Muro 
[24-27) 4 5 0.12% 0.15% 
 
Pájara, Yaiza, Fuencaliente, Santa Susanna 
[21-24) 3 8 0.09% 0.25% 
 
Salou, Santa Margalida, Sant Llorenç des Cardassar 
[18-21) 4 12 0.12% 0.37% 
 
Sant Joan de Labritja, Sant Pere Pescador, Antigua, Es Gran Migjorn 
[15-18) 14 26 0.43% 0.80% 
 
Adeje, La Oliva, Teguise, Mogán, Sant Lluís, Benidorm, Puerto de la Cruz 
[12-15) 14 40 0.43% 1.23% 
 
San Bartolomé de Tirajana, Torremolinos, Camaleño, Calvià, Tías, Lloret de Mar 
[9-12) 20 60 0.61% 1.84% 
 
Formentera, Boltaña, Santany í, Benalmádena, Tinajo, Calella, Valle Gran Rey 
[6-9) 33 93 1.01% 2.85% 
 
Roquetas de Mar, Estepona, Naut Aran, Rota, Nerja, Benicasim, Alp, Sallent de Gállego 
[3-6) 91 184 2.79% 5.64% 
 
Marbella, Mijas, Fuengirola, Manacor, Sitges, Casares, Sort, Cabranes 
                                                                                                                                                        
6
 Note that La Caixa’s municipal indicators of economic activity add up to 100,000 (rather than to 100), but this 
is of little significance for their interpretation. 
7
 As a practical note, note that the national average of LQtur (population-weighted) was actually 1.1 due to the 
great asymmetry in the sample. LQtur values in Table 2 are divided by 1.1 in order to reset the average at 1. 
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[1-3) 225 409 6.90% 12.54% 
 
Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla, Palma, Santiago, Toledo, Ibiza, Cullera, Biescas, Elciego 
<1 2,852 3,261 87.46% 100.00% 
 
Madrid, Zaragoza, Málaga, Murcia, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Bilbao, Alicante, Oviedo 
Source: Own elaboration 
The national average splits the sample into 409 tourist and 2,852 non-tourist municipalities 
and leaves major cities, such as Madrid, Zaragoza or Málaga in the non-tourist segment. 
While these cities receive a high number of visitors, the separation assumes that municipal 
budgets do not depend on tourism as much as the other cities. This also provides the desired 
size heterogeneity in both segments which is expected to lead to more robust results. 
Additional variables are collected from the National Statistics Institute (INE) and from La 
Caixa’s Yearbook. These include: i) Stratified population: According to the Spanish Law, 
local administrations are bound to provide minimum standards of service according to their 
population. To that end, five categories are defined: less than 5,000 residents (1); 5,000-
20,000 (2); 20,000-50,000 (3); 50,000-250,000 (4); and over 250,000 residents (5).8 ii) 
Dependent population (dep): Share of elderly (>65 years) and young (<16 years) residents. 
iii) Election years (ele): Binary variable that takes the value 1 for years with local elections 
(2003, 2007) and the years before (2002, 2006) and 0 otherwise. iv) Crisis (cri): Binary 
variable that takes the value 1 for the recession years (2008-2010) and 0 otherwise. v) Other: 
municipal area (km2), population density (den) in pop/km2 and unemployment rate (une). 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our sample, showing the differences between tourist 
and non-tourist municipalities. It is worth noting the higher average population density, land 
area and unemployment rate in tourist municipalities. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the municipal sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 Tourist Non-T Tourist Non-T Tourist Non-T Tourist Non-T 
Tourism intensity (LQtur) 3.85 0.15 3.96 0.27 1.02 0 25 0.98 
Dependent population (dep) 0.36 0.36 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.22 0.54 0.62 
Area (km2) 88.01 79.12 87.46 86.93 1 0 511 909 
Population density (den) 88.04 88.26 237.46 185.01 2.26 1.56 2799 3512 
Unemployment rate (une) 6.78 7.31 4.16 4.16 0.3 0 24.3 28.7 
Source: Own elaboration. Note: Non-T: Non-tourist municipality. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Three different analyses will be carried out. First, we compare the structure of local budgets 
between tourist and non-tourist municipalities for the entire sample. The percentage 
distribution of the different chapters is calculated and compositional data analysis (Aitchison, 
1986) is employed for statistical inference. Equality of means under the alternative 
hypotheses of equal or different covariance structures (H0) is tested against the assumptions 
of different means and covariance (Hm) using the method9 described in Pawlowsky-Glahn 
and Buccianti (2011). The test statistic Q has the following structure: 
 
(Eq. 4)                           Q0m = nt∙ln(│Σt0│/│Σtm│)+ nnt∙ln(│Σnt0│/│Σntm│) ̴ χ(deg) 
 
Where nt and nnt are the sample sizes of touristic and non-tourist groups, respectively; Σ 
denotes the covariance matrices under the different hypotheses; and deg refers to the number 
                                                 
8
 Regardless of their population, provincial capitals automatically belong to the top category 5. 
9
 This methodology requires performing an isometric log-ratio (ilr) transformation on the raw data. This 
procedure is performed using the Codapack software (Comas-Cufi and Thio-Henestrosa, 2011). 
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of constraints placed on the parameters by the null hypotheses. Equality of average values per 
capita for each expenditure and revenue chapter is also tested using the Student’s t approach.  
Secondly, we split the sample by population strata and the same t-tests are performed for 
additional financial indicators, including: i) Financial autonomy: the proportion of revenue 
chapters I to III over total revenues. It proxies the municipality’s ability to generate revenue, 
as opposed to being dependent on government transfers; ii) Financial burden: ratio between 
debt payments (chapter 0 of the second expenditure classification) and the sum of revenue 
chapters I to V. It indicates the share of local revenues that are allocated to repay public debt 
(Pastor and Soler, 2009); and iii) Fiscal gap per capita: difference between expenditures per 
capita (net of public debt) and revenues per capita (net of current and capital transfers). This 
alternative measure of deficit focuses on expenditures linked to the provision of public 
services and revenues raised within the municipality (Grembi et al., 2012). 
The third way to meet our research objectives is via regression analysis, which allows us to 
perform statistical inference in order to properly test the impact of tourism supply on 
municipal finances. The financial indicators explained above will be regressed against a 
vector of municipal characteristics, which are directly taken from the previous literature on 
municipal finances in Spain (see Section 2), in addition to our new indicator of tourism 
intensity. The estimated equations have the following structure (see abbreviations for the 
variables in Section 3.1):  
 
 (Eq. 5)                   Yi=f(LQtur, den, dep, une, km2, cri, ele, STRAT, AUT)+ε 
 
Where Y denotes five different endogenous variables: financial autonomy, taxes per capita, 
expenditures per capita, fiscal gap per capita, and debt per capita; ε denotes statistical 
disturbance; AUT denotes a vector of binary variables for the Autonomous Communities of 
Spain. The introduction of fixed effects at a municipal level was considered at an early stage 
but later dropped in order to prevent masking the effects of other variables. The regional 
dummies were included instead in order to control for additional factors that can have an 
impact on municipal costs or revenues, such as weather conditions, income per capita (as 
argued by Zafra-Gómez et al., 2009), fiscal regimes or insularity; STRAT denotes a vector of 
binary variables for the population strata, as has been done in previous studies. However, 
besides the evident search for economies of scale, we are more interested in any possible 
interactions between tourism intensity and population. It is also worth noting the introduction 
of the crisis effect (cri), which is directly taken from the recent study by López-Hernández et 
al. (2012) that confirmed the negative impact of the global recession on municipal finances in 
Spain. A linear time trend was removed because of the significant correlation with election 
years. Other interesting variables, such as commercial or industrial development (proposed 
by Zafra-Gómez et al., 2009), political orientation, or the population centres employed by 
Fluvià et al. (2008) are not included due to data not being available for the full sample period.  
While there are suitable estimation methods that are specific for panel data, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) is considered appropriate for the descriptive purposes of this paper. 
Coefficients will be standardised to allow for easier interpretation of results, particularly with 
regards to the relative impact of each variable on the different indicators. Table 4 provides the 
matrix of linear correlation among the non-binary explanatory variables. 
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Table 4. Linear correlations among the explanatory variables 
 LQtur dep une den km2 
LQtur 1.000 -0.166 -0.065 -0.004 0.028 
dep -0.166 1.000 -0.004 -0.241 0.225 
une -0.065 -0.004 1.000 0.041 0.103 
den -0.004 -0.241 0.041 1.000 -0.147 
km2 0.028 0.225 0.103 -0.147 1.000 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
4. RES ULTS  AND DIS CUS S ION 
4.1 Budget structures 
Table 5 shows the comparative analysis of revenue structures. Overall, the percentage 
distribution of revenues is shown to significantly differ between the tourist and non-tourist 
clusters (tested using the statistic from Eq. 4). The same conclusion is obtained for most of 
the average revenue chapters per capita, with tourist municipalities presenting higher values 
in all cases. This is expected in some categories, such as direct and indirect taxes, due to the 
increased commercial orientation of tourist areas. It is also worth noting that tourist 
municipalities receive more support from other administrations in terms of current transfers. 
While this suggests that the tourist nature of a municipality is acknowledged by regional 
governments as a determinant for the allocation of public funds, it is surprising to see that 
capital transfers, linked to infrastructure developments, do not show the expected difference 
in per capita values and the revenue proportion is higher in non-tourist municipalities. 
 
Table 5. Breakdown of municipal revenues per capita 
Revenue chapters 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Tourist Non-Tourist Tourist Non-Tourist 
p/c %  p/c %  p/c p/c 
I. Direct taxes 303.94* 0.25* 206.00 0.22 3.94 1.14 
II. Indirect taxes 63.81* 0.05 45.69 0.04 104.03 141.43 
III. Other local taxes 226.84* 0.18 157.33 0.16 226.10 213.76 
IV. Current transfers 282.69* 0.27 271.41 0.31 158.94 159.95 
V. Property  income 38.63* 0.03 21.72 0.02 95.97 63.96 
VI. Disposal of assets 38.54* 0.03 36.11 0.03 145.35 201.66 
VII. Capital transfers 174.78* 0.15 172.62 0.17 219.45 202.03 
VIII. Financial assets 3.74* 0.002 1.47 0.001 71.78 26.85 
IX. Financial liabilities 65.72* 0.05 49.25 0.05 138.61 118.97 
Source: Own elaboration. Note: p/c: per capita variables. %: percentage over total revenues. Asterisk indicates a statistically  significant 
(5%) difference between tourist and non-tourist groups. 
 
Table 6. Breakdown of municipal expenditures per capita (1) 
Revenue chapters 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Tourist Non-Tourist Tourist Non-Tourist 
p/c %  p/c %  p/c p/c 
I. Personnel 346.68* 0.31* 261.45 0.30 182.67 139.61 
II. Goods and services 341.28* 0.30 263.59 0.29 208.37 160.20 
III. Financial expenses 14.20* 0.01 9.50 0.01 16.26 11.49 
IV. Current transfers 63.96* 0.06 49.78 0.05 73.86 59.33 
VI. Property expenses 329.58* 0.03 303.60 0.30 325.02 321.12 
VII. Capital transfers 14.10* 0.01 10.13 0.01 41.52 45.13 
VIII. Financial assets 4.73* 0.01 1.77 0.001 75.67 29.84 
IX. Financial liabilities 40.04* 0.03 31.16 0.03 60.05 65.76 
Source: Own elaboration. Note: p/c: per capita variables. %: percentage over total expenditures. Asterisk indicates a statistically  significant 
(5%) difference between tourist and non-tourist groups. 
 
Table 6 paints a similar picture. Significant differences exist overall and in the individual 
chapters, and it can be clearly seen that tourist municipalities present higher average levels of 
expenditure, including those related to infrastructure and other properties (Chapter VI). This 
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suggests an imbalance between revenues from capital transfers (Table 5), which do not differ 
between groups, and property expenses that are, on average, 8.5% higher in tourist 
municipalities (Table 6). Such a funding gap might explain the higher levels of public debt in 
said cluster, as indicated in Table 7. Again, tourist municipalities are shown to experience 
higher levels of per capita expenditure in all categories, including basic services such as 
housing (residential or recreational), cleaning and waste management, or environment 
protection; social services such as health or culture; regulation; and particularly, police and 
emergency costs, which are 53% higher, on average, in the tourist municipalities. All these 
items are a major concern for the FEMP, and typically feature in their demands for alternative 
funding sources. 
 
Table 7. Breakdown of municipal expenditures per capita (2) 
Revenue chapters 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Tourist Non-Tourist Tourist Non-Tourist 
p/c %  p/c %  p/c p/c 
1. Basic services 189.72* 0.17* 152.16 0.17 175.82 169.79 
2. Police and emergency  93.77* 0.07 61.24 0.06 172.87 131 
3. Social protection 105.04* 0.10 98.14 0.11 90.55 93.57 
4. Social services 498.40* 0.43 413.93 0.44 363.04 343.59 
5. Economic activities 123.38* 0.10 103.99 0.11 195.51 170.48 
6. General regulation 53.92* 0.04 39.24 0.04 138.73 106 
7. Economic regulation 161.56* 0.12 130.11 0.12 436.97 387.08 
9. Transfers 11.80* 0.01 9.52 0.01 35.39 24.53 
0. Public debt 53.26* 0.05 39.64 0.04 70.32 75.85 
Source: Own elaboration. Note: p/c: per capita variables. %: percentage over total expenditures. Asterisk indicates a statistically  significant 
(5%) difference between tourist and non-tourist groups. 
 
The above-mentioned differences are brought together in Table 8, which combines both 
expenditure and revenue information in simple financial indicators. In order to improve the 
analysis, the results are further disaggregated in population strata. Firstly, note that non-
capital tourist municipalities up to 250,000 residents (strata 1-4) enjoy significantly more 
average financial autonomy than their non-tourist counterparts, which translates into a higher 
potential for revenue generation and less dependence on government transfers. Furthermore, 
there is little difference in the financial burden, which indicates the share of local revenues 
that are allocated to repay public debt. Both types of municipalities spend around 6% on that 
concept and, in the only case there is a substantial discrepancy (group 2), financial burden is 
actually higher in non-tourist areas.  
Overall, fiscal gap per capita does not significantly differ between both groups, which, at first 
sight, could be interpreted as a sign that tourism activity actually evens itself out for Spanish 
municipalities. However, a closer examination of the individual population groups reveals a 
more complex situation. Non-capital tourist municipalities between 5,000-250,000 residents 
(strata 2-4) do actually enjoy lower fiscal gaps than their non-tourist counterparts. The 
opposite happens for the smallest municipalities, and the largest cities in group 5 cannot be 
statistically differentiated due to their high variability. 
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Table 8. Financial indicators 
Indicator Strat. Tourist  Non-Tourist 
  mean s.d.  mean s.d. 
Financial autonomy 
1 0.421 0.004 * 0.397 0.001 
2 0.527 0.004 * 0.451 0.001 
3 0.561 0.005 * 0.484 0.002 
4 0.593 0.007 * 0.513 0.003 
5 0.511 0.015  0.484 0.008 
Total 0.478 0.002 * 0.422 0.001 
Financial burden 
1 0.049 0.001  0.051 0.001 
2 0.067 0.002 * 0.073 0.001 
3 0.077 0.002  0.088 0.001 
4 0.086 0.005  0.085 0.002 
5 0.097 0.012  0.100 0.008 
Total 0.060 0.001  0.060 0.001 
Fiscal gap per capita 
1 411.71 9.537 * 388.43 3.741 
2 291.05 8.922 * 310.02 3.226 
3 218.23 10.561 * 261.97 5.276 
4 174.58 12.150 * 236.09 6.805 
5 268.69 28.048  245.34 21.704 
Total 342.68 6.068  353.75 2.567 
Source: Own elaboration. Asterisk indicates a statistically  significant (5%) difference between tourist and non-tourist groups. 
These first results mostly agree with the conclusions from Pastor and Soler (2009) by 
diminishing the credibility of the “chronic deficit” hypothesis put forward by the FEMP. The 
negative impact of tourist activity on local finances is only observed in the smallest 
municipalities and the complete opposite occurs in the vast majority of the remaining sample. 
Nevertheless, while the descriptive statistics shown above have a clear meaning, the 
presumed impacts could be affected by other variables. Thus, it is necessary to refine the 
methodology in order to establish the robust causal relationship required by our policy 
objective. To that end, a regression analysis is carried out. 
4.2 Regression analysis 
The impact of tourism supply on five endogenous variables (financial autonomy, expenditure, 
taxes, fiscal gap and debt per capita) is tested by estimating the linear specifications described 
in Equation 5. Note that second-order interactions between tourism intensity and the 
population strata are included, as well as a squared tourism coefficient that reinforces the 
impact of different levels of tourism specialisation seen in Table 2. The five resulting 
equations are shown in Table 9. While most parameters are significant at a 95% confidence 
level, goodness-of-fit (measured by the R2 coefficient) varies widely and ranges between 
41.8% down to 5.9% in the case of the debt equation, which is clearly affected by complex 
unpredictable factors at a local level. However, note that the predictive capacity of the model 
is of little use for our research objective. On the contrary, the F-coefficient is significant in all 
cases, indicating that the identified interactions contribute to explaining the dependent 
variable. 
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Table 9. Linear regression coefficients 
 
Financial autonomy Expenditures per capita Taxes per capita Fiscal gap per capita Debt per capita 
Variables Unstand. Stand. 
 
Unstand. Stand. 
 
Unstand. Stand. 
 
Unstand. Stand. 
 
Unstand. Stand. 
 LQtur 0.008 0.129 * 68.626 0.287 * 47.335 0.275 * 5.683 0.033 * 2.667 0.083 * 
LQtur*LQtur 0.000 -0.073 * -1.321 -0.097 * -1.009 -0.103 * 0.002 0.000 
 
-0.010 -0.005 
 LQtur*strat2 0.005 0.058 * -8.469 -0.025 * 2.858 0.012 
 
-9.703 -0.040 * -1.010 -0.022 * 
LQtur*strat3 0.004 0.023 * -13.279 -0.022 * -0.534 -0.001 
 
-11.573 -0.026 * -0.495 -0.006 
 LQtur*strat4 0.011 0.040 * -14.002 -0.014 * 7.537 0.010 * -15.279 -0.021 * -0.437 -0.003 
 LQtur*strat5 0.019 0.009 
 
1.404 0.000 
 
23.131 0.004 
 
8.504 0.001 
 
-13.055 -0.012 
 strat2 0.043 0.125 * -89.302 -0.071 * -6.222 -0.007 
 
-90.061 -0.100 * 16.977 0.101 * 
strat3 0.070 0.117 * -122.861 -0.056 * -1.163 -0.001 
 
-149.154 -0.094 * 24.867 0.084 * 
strat4 0.090 0.109 * -96.108 -0.031 * 29.029 0.013 * -163.293 -0.074 * 31.044 0.076 * 
strat5 0.087 0.039 * -60.010 -0.007 * 47.173 0.008 * -198.678 -0.033 * 53.591 0.048 * 
ele -0.003 -0.010 * 96.634 0.086 * 34.925 0.043 * 68.281 0.084 * 2.749 0.018 * 
dep -0.956 -0.285 * -1876.308 -0.156 * -2072.688 -0.240 * 728.002 0.085 * -2.536 -0.002 
 une -0.002 -0.057 * 5.705 0.044 * -1.497 -0.016 * 8.865 0.091 * 0.225 0.012 
 den 0.0001 -0.073 * -0.027 -0.062 * -0.022 -0.070 * 0.003 0.009 * -0.001 -0.020 * 
km2 0.000 -0.022 * 0.175 0.036 * 0.037 0.011 * 0.101 0.029 * 0.016 0.025 * 
cri -0.033 -0.099 * 306.212 0.251 * 85.873 0.098 * 230.331 0.238 * 4.197 0.023 * 
aut2 0.079 0.092 * 313.860 0.102 * 206.584 0.093 * 19.680 0.009 
 
20.080 0.049 * 
aut3 0.029 0.026 * 53.692 0.013 
 
31.105 0.011 * 54.153 0.019 * -13.191 -0.024 * 
aut4 0.077 0.069 * -4.913 -0.001 * 19.355 0.007 
 
16.230 0.006 
 
1.643 0.003 
 aut5 -0.115 -0.123 * 45.645 0.013 * -143.606 -0.058 * 263.024 0.106 * -6.908 -0.015 * 
aut6 0.127 0.124 * -81.371 -0.021 * 62.779 0.023 * -86.036 -0.032 * -15.456 -0.031 * 
aut7 0.111 0.204 * 41.649 0.021 * 144.745 0.104 * -100.696 -0.072 * -9.952 -0.038 * 
aut8 0.106 0.186 * -50.841 -0.025 * 61.048 0.042 * -111.451 -0.076 * -7.201 -0.026 * 
aut9 0.149 0.343 * 312.390 0.196 * 290.633 0.254 * -41.498 -0.036 * 23.698 0.112 * 
aut10 0.024 0.035 * -91.597 -0.037 * 9.802 0.006 
 
-56.488 -0.032 * -20.887 -0.064 * 
aut11 -0.016 -0.029 * -130.932 -0.067 * -39.268 -0.028 * -24.968 -0.018 * -22.104 -0.085 * 
aut12 0.181 0.035 * 271.914 0.015 * 263.724 0.020 * -25.498 -0.002 
 
8.296 0.004 
 aut13 0.175 0.097 * 139.057 0.021 * 210.469 0.045 * -92.009 -0.019 * 19.894 0.023 * 
aut14 0.070 0.085 * 139.492 0.049 * 85.343 0.042 * 7.782 0.004 
 
-0.862 -0.002 
 aut15 0.051 0.035 * 96.235 0.019 * 78.714 0.021 * 12.238 0.003 
 
-14.884 -0.021 * 
aut16 0.051 0.052 * 399.527 0.115 * 193.791 0.077 * 56.660 0.023 * 17.833 0.038 * 
aut17 -0.042 -0.058 * 560.626 0.212 * 148.066 0.078 * 364.341 0.192 * 5.034 0.014 * 
aut18 0.141 0.273 * 64.894 0.035 * 149.687 0.112 * -93.239 -0.070 * -0.076 0.000 
 constant 0.704 - * 1327.521 - 
 
999.498 - * -2.406 - 
 
28.873 - * 
Observations 
 
30,088 
  
31,809 
  
31,809 
  
28,596 
  
28,596 
 F 
 
752.86 * 
 
358.58 * 
 
428.43 * 
 
180.06 * 
 
125.99 * 
R-squared 
 
0.4182 
  
0.242 
  
0.204 
  
0.156 
  
0.059 
 Asterisk indicates statistically significant (5%) coefficients. Unstand: Unstandardized coefficients. Stand: Standardized coefficients. 
 
The standardized coefficients allow us to compare the relative impacts of each variable. The 
dependent population is shown to have the largest negative influence on financial autonomy, 
expenditure and revenues per capita. This translates into a positive impact on fiscal gaps, as 
the reduction of tax revenues offsets the observed cost savings, likely linked to different 
patterns of public service consumption between dependent and non-dependent populations. 
The picture is similar for unemployed residents, except for the fact that they actually increase 
municipal expenditures (i.e. employment services). We also found that higher population 
density leads to lower expenditures per capita, clearly indicating the existence of returns to 
density in the provision of public services at a municipal level. Expenditures per capita are 
shown to increase around election years, thus agreeing with the previous literature (e.g., Galli 
and Rossi, 2002). In addition, note that tax revenue does not keep up with the increased 
spending for the same electoral reasons. The impact of the recession years covered by our 
sample (2008-2010) is also as expected, with a reduction in financial autonomy, mainly 
driven by the increase in demand for social services that higher taxes cannot fully cover. In 
both cases, municipalities experience larger fiscal gaps and are pushed into debt. 
The population coefficients in the expenditure equation (note the negative sign and increasing 
absolute value) indicate the existence of economies of scale in the provision of public 
services at a municipal level up to the third category (i.e. between 1,000-50,000 residents). 
From that point, average local expenditures per capita rise again. This result may explain the 
inconclusive findings reported by the previous literature, which has not settled on either 
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increasing or decreasing scale economies (see Fluvià et al., 2008). The reason may be that 
municipal cost curves are indeed U-shaped, and different scale effects can be observed if 
average municipal sizes in the sample differ significantly. On the revenue side, large cities 
experience a significant revenue effect that translates into better financial autonomy and 
lower fiscal gaps per capita, yet higher levels of debt are also observed. 
For the purposes of this research, however, the tourism-related coefficients are the most 
relevant as they allow us to confirm the conclusions obtained in the previous section. Again, 
financial autonomy is positively affected by tourism intensity for all municipalities. The same 
applies to expenditures and taxes per capita, though the specific impacts are modulated by 
population size. The negative signs of the significant interactions can be clearly interpreted as 
tourism activity actually expanding the range of population that municipalities enjoy scale 
economies within. This is another aspect that reinforces the positive impact of tourism on 
local finances. With regards to the fiscal gap, it is worth noting that tourism actually helps 
municipalities between 5,000 to 250,000 residents (excluding provincial capitals) to achieve 
lower deficit and reduced indebtedness. Thus, we can conclude that in all these 
municipalities, which comprise more than half of the Spanish population, tourism activity 
does not create a burden to local budgets, as the improved ability for revenue generation 
offsets the increased expenditures required to service the floating visitor population. 
On the other hand, and agreeing with the results from Table 8, a direct link between tourism, 
deficit and debt can be established for groups 1 and 5, which are not statistically 
differentiated in the fiscal gap equation. Therefore, it is only in these extreme cases that the 
data supports the hypothesis of the tourism-related “chronic deficit” put forward by the 
FEMP. Thus, the option of introducing new tourist taxes should be more restricted in scope 
and still needs to depend upon further evidence of possible cost inefficiency by the affected 
municipalities. It is only by testing these hypotheses that the demands of the affected 
municipalities can be justified. 
In the meantime, the policy recommendation for the central and regional governments is to 
encourage all local administrations in tourist and non-tourist areas to reduce costs. While this 
can be achieved in a variety of ways, our results clearly suggest that full or partial 
consolidation of smaller municipalities would be an effective policy, which aims to exploit 
the economies of scale that exist in the provision of public services at a municipal level, with 
the limitations discussed by Fluvià et al. (2008) regarding infrastructure that cannot be 
concentrated. This provides economic justification for the local administrations to adhere to 
the public sector rationalization programme put forward by the Spanish government in 2013.  
5. S UMMARY 
This paper aims to determine if tourism activity has a negative impact on local finances in the 
context of a debate regarding a more differentiated regulatory framework for tourist 
municipalities in Spain. To that end, a comparative analysis of budget structures and the 
financial situation between tourist and non-tourist municipalities is carried out using panel 
data of more than 3,200 local entities from 2001-2010. An indicator of tourism intensity, 
based on tax revenues, is used to split the sample into tourist and non-tourist groups. The 
determinants of expenditure, revenues and deficit per capita are identified using linear 
regression.  
Simple inferential statistics reveal that tourist municipalities present higher average revenues 
per capita in all categories, and a higher proportion of tax revenues that leads to more 
financial autonomy than the non-tourist group. On the other hand, the tourist cluster presents 
higher levels of expenditure, including police, housing, environmental, social services and 
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regulation. In addition, tourist municipalities receive comparatively less support for 
infrastructure developments from other administrations. In spite of this, tourism is shown to 
have a beneficial impact on local finances for the specialised municipalities between 5,000 to 
250,000 residents (excluding capitals), as they achieve lower deficit, reduced indebtedness, 
and larger scale economies. Only for the smallest and largest municipalities, tourism is shown 
to create a burden on local budgets, as the improved ability for revenue generation does not 
match the increased expenditures required to service the floating visitor population. 
Thus, the first conclusion is that the option of introducing new tourist taxes or alternative 
funding sources should be more restricted in scope and never introduced as a general option 
that is available to the entire spectrum of tourist municipalities. Furthermore, even its 
restricted implementation is not fully supported by our limited empirical evidence. These 
results simply set the stage for future research on the likely impact of cost inefficiency by the 
affected municipalities, which may link to inflated expenditures. It is only by testing these 
hypotheses that the demands of the affected municipalities for a new regulatory framework 
can be justified. In the meantime, the policy recommendation is to encourage all local 
administrations to reduce costs. Our results clearly suggest that the consolidation of smaller 
municipalities would be an effective policy, aimed at exploiting the economies of scale.  
Finally, it is also worth noting that this study presents some limitations, which are mostly 
related to missing variables that could not be included because they were unavailable at the 
required level of disaggregation. These limitations become new targets for future research, 
such as: i) the introduction of new variables in the regression, such as income per capita, 
population centres, industrial or commercial development, ii) explicit consideration of 
different levels of tourist specialisation and improving the municipal classification in that 
sense, and iii) the measurement of the evolution of visitors to each region, in order to further 
discriminate between expanding and declining destinations. This can lead to a better 
understanding of the impact of tourism on local budgets. 
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